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SONJA B.  STARR & M. MARIT REHAVI 
On Estimating Disparity and Inferring Causation: 
Sur-Reply to the U.S. Sentencing Commission Staff 
In this Essay, Professors Starr and Rehavi respond to the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s empirical staff’s criticisms of their recent article, which found, contrary 
to the Commission’s prior work, no evidence that racial disparity in sentences 
increased in response to United States v. Booker. As Starr and Rehavi suggest, their 
differences with the Commission perhaps relate to differing objectives. The 
Commission staff’s reply expresses a lack of interest in identifying Booker’s causal 
effects; in contrast, that is Starr and Rehavi’s central objective. In addition, Starr and 
Rehavi’s approach also accounts for disparities arising throughout the post-arrest 
justice process, extending beyond the Commission’s narrower focus on disparities in 
adherence to the Sentencing Guidelines. Beyond these core disagreements, Starr and 
Rehavi point to several ways in which the reply’s other criticisms inaccurately describe 
their claims, their methods, and the scope of their study’s sample. 
 
In our article, we examined the effects of United States v. Booker on racial 
disparity throughout the federal criminal justice process, using a newly 
constructed dataset that traces cases from arrest through sentencing.1 Using an 
econometric method for causal inference, a regression discontinuity-style 
design, we found no evidence that Booker or its progeny increased black-white 
disparity in the sentences received by arrestees with the same arrest offense and 
underlying characteristics. Nor did we find any substantial increases in 
disparity in charging, plea-bargaining, or fact-finding. While our causal 
analysis focused on Booker’s short-term effects, analyses of the longer-term 
trend also showed that the sentence gap among otherwise-similar black and 
white arrestees did not grow in the years following Booker. We therefore 
 
1. Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the 
Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2 (2013). 
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concluded that there is no evidence that racial disparity has increased since 
Booker, much less because of it. 
Our findings conflicted with the conclusions of two U.S. Sentencing 
Commission reports. The Commission found that the sentence gap between 
comparable black and white men had approximately quadrupled in the wake of 
Booker and its progeny, implied that Booker’s expansion of judicial discretion 
was the cause of that quadrupling (and of an increase in interdistrict disparity), 
and accordingly proposed various legislative fixes to reimpose constraints on 
judicial discretion. We critiqued the methods used by these reports as well as 
other sentencing-disparity research. In particular, we argued that estimates of 
sentence gaps should not use control variables that filter out the components of 
those gaps that arise from decision-making earlier in the justice process. We 
also argued that the Commission’s method of comparing the time periods 
before and after Booker and its successors could not support causal inferences 
about Booker’s effects, because it could not disentangle those effects from 
background trends and events. 
The Commission’s empirical staff members—the authors of the prior 
reports—have now published a reply.2 We appreciate their taking the time to 
engage with these issues, and also appreciate the Commission’s longstanding 
efforts to understand sentencing disparities. We wholeheartedly agree that 
racial disparities exist in the federal system and are troubling. However, we 
believe that designing effective policies to address unwarranted disparities 
requires rigorous identification of their causes, and we believe the 
Commission’s approach falls short of this mark. Not everything that has 
happened in sentencing since 2005 is the result of Booker. We also believe that 
the potential sources of sentence disparity begin far earlier in the process than 
the judge’s final sentencing decision, which is the focus of the Commission’s 
analysis. Booker altered the legal landscape for prosecutors, defendants, and 
judges, and one cannot get a complete picture of its effects on disparity by only 
comparing pre- and post-Booker disparities in the last narrow slice of the 
criminal justice process. 
The reply unfortunately contains a number of mischaracterizations of our 
findings and approach. For example, the reply repeatedly suggests, beginning 
with its title, that we have claimed that judges don’t “matter at sentencing.” 
But to the contrary, our method examines changes in judicial behavior far more 
comprehensively than the Commission’s does, and also examines changes in 
the behavior of other important actors who also matter. While the Commission 
repeatedly claims that we have ignored the “reality of the actual sentencing 
 
2. Glenn R. Schmitt et al., Why Judges Matter at Sentencing: A Reply to Starr and Rehavi, 123 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 251 (2013). 
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process,”3 and in particular that we have disregarded the legal and practical 
importance of the determination of the Guidelines sentencing range, in fact it is 
the Commission’s approach that effectively disregards the importance of that 
process by excluding any disparities that arise in it from its ultimate sentence 
disparity estimates. Our approach, by contrast, takes each stage in the justice 
process seriously (including Guidelines fact-finding) by assessing Booker’s 
effects on disparities in all of them, individually and in the aggregate. In short, 
we do not ignore variables like the presumptive Guidelines sentence; we treat 
them as outcomes to be analyzed, rather than controls to be filtered out. 
In addition, the reply frequently appears to confuse the main results 
presented in our article—our study of Booker’s effects—with our separate study 
of federal charging disparities, which we briefly summarize and discuss in Part 
II of our article. For example, the reply repeatedly alleges that we exclude drug 
cases.4 This was true of many (but not all) of the analyses in our charging 
study, but it is not true of the Booker study: the Booker study’s sample includes 
all major case categories other than immigration, as the article makes clear. The 
reply’s focus on the other study is curious, because it is the Booker study that 
most directly relates to the Commission’s own reports. In its comparatively 
limited discussion of Booker, the reply seems to retreat from the claim that the 
Commission’s findings can be interpreted causally, and states that identifying 
causation is unimportant.5 But without evidence that Booker caused an increase 
in racial disparity, racial disparity does not justify policy proposals designed to 
reverse Booker’s effects. 
This sur-reply is organized in four parts. First, we briefly summarize our 
study’s methods and findings. Second, we consider the reply’s critique of our 
decision to explore disparities arising from earlier procedural stages rather than 
only considering the sentencing stage in isolation. Third, we address the causal 
inference issue and the criticisms of our regression discontinuity approach. 
Fourth, we show that the reply’s criticisms pertaining to the definition of our 
sample are unsound, and that several of them are simply inapplicable to the 
sample used in this study. 
i .  our study of booker ’s  effects  
The principal results reported in our article stem from a study of changes in 
black-white racial disparities in federal cases, excluding immigration, during 
the time period surrounding United States v. Booker. We constructed a unique 
 
3. Id. at 258; see also id. at 271-72. 
4. Id. at 266-67. 
5. Id. at 269-71. 
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dataset that combined records from four federal agencies, allowing us to trace 
cases from arrest through sentencing. By controlling for arrest offense 
characteristics and other prior traits (such as criminal history), we were able to 
compare black and white arrestees whose cases looked similar when they 
entered the federal justice system, and estimate the divergence of their fates at 
each subsequent stage of the justice process as well as Booker’s effects on 
disparities at all those stages. Because the pre-sentencing stages have crucial 
consequences for the sentence,6 we believe that understanding them is essential 
to assessing Booker’s impact on racial disparities in ultimate sentence outcomes. 
Unlike the Commission’s alternate approach, which we discuss further below, 
we therefore did not use control variables that filter out the share of the 
sentence gap that arises from those earlier stages. 
Our first cut of our data, presented in Table 1 of our article, was a 
description of the long-term linear time trends in the black-white sentence gap 
over the period from May 2003 through September 2009 (a period that directly 
corresponded to the period during which the Sentencing Commission’s 2010 
report had found that disparity among black and white males had more than 
quadrupled, from 5.5% to 23%). Our assessment of these long-term trends did 
not speak to Booker’s causal effects—as we explain below, it is dangerous to 
attribute long-term trends to a single intervening event. Instead, this 
estimation was simply designed to assess whether racial disparities for 
comparable individuals arrested for the same offense did, in fact, grow during 
the study period. 
We found that they did not. Note that our claim is not that racial disparity 
is not a problem, but rather that the problem has remained fairly stable in 
scale. One only finds an upward trend in disparity if, like the Commission, one 
focuses on the final slice of the justice process in isolation—excluding the 
portions of the sentence gap that come from all of the earlier procedural stages. 
We also found that black-white disparity in the Guidelines offense level (and 
thus in the “presumptive sentence,” which is based on that offense level 
combined with criminal history) declined during the same period, conditional 
on the arrest offense and other prior traits. This change provides one plausible 
explanation for the difference between our findings and the Commission’s. 
The Commission is measuring sentence gaps relative to the presumptive 
sentence, but if racial disparity in the presumptive sentence itself declines 
(holding underlying conduct constant), a gap measured this way will appear to 
 
6. This point is widely accepted by legal scholars, as discussed in Section II.A of our article, 
and we provided empirical evidence for it in our separate study, which is discussed in Part II 
of our Yale Law Journal article. See M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in 
Federal Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences (Univ. of Mich. Program in Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 12-002, 2012) (under review), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985377. 
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grow even if final sentences themselves are actually unchanged. This apparent 
growth is an artifact of the Commission’s estimation strategy—it does not 
mean that disparity actually got worse among defendants with similar 
underlying conduct. 
Next, we turned to the question of Booker’s causal effects on disparities at 
each key stage of the process. The question whether Booker (and its progeny, 
United States v. Gall and United States v. Kimbrough) caused changes in racial 
disparity is quite different from the question whether racial disparity was larger 
after those cases were decided. Many things change over time. If disparity 
simply grew over time due to gradual background trends or events unrelated to 
Booker, disparities would appear larger in the post-Booker and especially the 
post-Gall/Kimbrough periods, just as the Commission found. 
To assess Booker’s causal effects rigorously, we used a regression 
discontinuity-style estimator (RD), which filters out background trends and 
focuses on sharp breaks in disparity occurring immediately after Booker. We 
applied this method to assess changes in each of the major procedural stages 
(charging, plea-bargaining, and sentencing) by exploiting the fact that criminal 
cases have several key moments. We thus assessed changes in initial charging 
(and their consequences for downstream outcomes, including the ultimate 
sentence) by looking for sudden changes as the charging date passed Booker. 
Similarly, we assessed changes in plea-bargaining and in sentencing (including 
fact-finding) via analyses that turned on the dates of conviction and 
sentencing, respectively. The specific results are detailed in our article 
(including in Table 2) and will not be repeated here, but the upshot is that 
there is no evidence that Booker caused increases in racial disparity in any aspect 
of the judicial process.7 While our main analyses focused on Booker for reasons 
explained in our article, we also found no notable changes in racial disparity in 
the aftermath of Gall/Kimbrough. 
Our article did not include an RD analysis that parallels the Commission’s 
approach to estimating disparity—that is, one that assesses whether, 
immediately after Booker, there were sharp changes in sentence disparities 
when one controls for the presumptive sentence, the mandatory minimum, and 
departure status. We still do not favor this method, but for comparative 
purposes, we have now carried out an additional analysis that applies the RD 
method detailed in our article, but uses a set of control variables closely 
paralleling the Commission’s. Specifically, we repeated the regressions shown 
in Table 2, Panel 3C of our article (estimating the prison sentence outcome by 
 
7. There appears to have been a one-month spike in racial disparity in the use of mandatory 
minimum charges by prosecutors, but this effect seems to have been very short term, so we 
do not give it serious weight. See Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 58-65. Sentence outcomes 
actually show a statistically significant reduction in cases sentenced after Booker. Id. at 67-71. 
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sentencing date), but altered the control variables. We removed our arrest-
offense controls and replaced them with the Guidelines offense level,8 the 
mandatory minimum indicator, broad offense-category controls similar to the 
Commission’s, and indicators for the existence of government-initiated 
downward departures, other downward departures, and upward departures. 
The results are shown in Table 1 and visually depicted in Figure 1 (which, like 
the figures in our article, shows monthly averages for black and white residual 
sentences after the portions explained by the controls are removed). 
 
Table 1. 
regression discontinuity analysis of booker’s effects on prison 
outcomes  
With Offense Level, Departure Status, and Mandatory Minimum Controls 
 
 
 Prison Sentence (in Months) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
-3.282* -4.156* -3.722* 2.231†  
Booker 
(1.59) (1.83) (1.63) (1.31) 
     
-1.823 -3.6 -4.9 -15.06** Booker  
* Black Defendant (3.75) (4.18) (4.16) (3.84) 
     
Number of Observations 57,244 38,372 57,244 38,372 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.659 0.657 0.659 0.657 
     
Degree of Polynomial 2nd 2nd 3rd 3rd 
Window Around Booker 18 12 18 12 
Standard errors clustered by race*sentencing month are in parentheses. All regressions 
include separate black and white polynomials in the distance of the sentencing data from 
Booker, along with controls for the presence of a mandatory minimum, the Guideline offense 
level, criminal history, offense categories, age, gender, and citizenship, and indicators for 
government-initiated departures, other downward departures, and upward departures. 
† p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01. 
 
8. Because criminal history is already in our model, using the Guidelines offense level means 
that the two determinants of the presumptive sentence are both in the model. 





This additional analysis shows no increase in black-white sentencing 
disparity in cases sentenced after Booker. Indeed, in all four specifications the 
estimated change in disparity at Booker is negative, although this reduction is 
significant and sizeable in only one of the four specifications.9 Figure 1 likewise 
shows that while sentences (after controlling for these variables) fell overall 
after Booker, this change affected black and white defendants approximately 
equally. There is no discernible increase in disparity: the distance between the 
white and black lines does not grow. The beginning of the fall in sentences for 
white defendants actually appears to predate Booker. That is, even when one 
estimates disparity the Commission’s way (but uses a proper method for causal 
inference), Booker does not appear to have increased it. 
 
9. As detailed in our article, we carried out every regression discontinuity analysis using varied 
functional forms (quadratic versus cubic) and time windows within which the functions 
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Figure 1.  
average prison sentences  
After Accounting for Offense Level, Mandatory Minimum, and Departure Status 
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i i .  should sentence disparity estimates incorporate 
multiple procedural sources?  
The first fundamental difference between our approach and that of the 
Commission’s reports (as well as other existing literature) pertains to the way 
disparity is estimated. We control for the arrest offense and other prior 
characteristics, while the Commission controls for a set of variables including 
the “presumptive sentence” (the low end of the Guidelines range), the 
mandatory minimum sentence, and indicators of whether and in what 
direction the judge chose to depart from the Guidelines. Disparity estimates 
using the Commission’s controls filter out disparities in charging, plea-
bargaining, sentencing fact-finding, and even the judge’s departure decision. 
Once one has already controlled for the existence of a departure, its direction, 
and the point from which the judge considers departing (the presumptive 
sentence), disparities that remain presumably must mainly be driven by 
disparities in departure magnitude and disparities in the choice of sentence 
within the guidelines range. 
The Commission’s approach reflects a very narrow definition of what 
sources of disparity policymakers should care about when assessing Booker’s 
effects. The choices made at the earlier procedural stages have sentencing 
consequences, and the Commission’s estimates filter out those consequences. 
Moreover, the variables the Commission controls for could have been changed 
by Booker itself or by other trends and events in the years covered by the study. 
If, for instance, prosecutors used mandatory minimums differently in the later 
years, fact-finding changed, or judges departed more often, these control 
variables would not have the same relationship to underlying criminal conduct 
before and after Booker, and those changes might not affect black and white 
defendants equally. This makes it difficult to compare estimates of sentence 
disparity for the different time periods. 
As our article discusses, what constitutes an appropriate method or control 
depends upon the goal of the analysis. We are especially concerned with the 
ultimate disparity in sentence outcomes for black and white offenders who had 
similar criminal conduct, criminal history, and other prior traits—so those 
characteristics are what we aim to control for, using arrest offense as the best 
possible proxy for criminal conduct. We thus measure disparities arising at 
each stage of the justice process, which could compound or offset one another. 
We think the objective of equal treatment generally demands a process-wide 
approach, because sentence inequalities for similar offenders are troubling 
whether they arise in charging, plea-bargaining, fact-finding, departure 
decisions, or the ultimate choice of sentence. 
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And indeed, this point was eloquently stated by the Sentencing 
Commission itself in a report it released in 2004, the year before Booker.10 In 
that report, the Commission carefully explained the serious limitations of an 
approach to sentence-disparity analysis that focused only on disparities in the 
final sentencing decision “in isolation.”11 It cited “a variety of evidence,” 
including surveys and qualitative studies, suggesting “that disparate treatment 
of similar offenders is common at presentencing stages.”12 The report 
concluded that such earlier-stage disparities would have important sentencing 
consequences, especially in light of the presumptive Guidelines system that 
then existed, under which “there is little a judge can do to compensate” for 
charging disparities.13 The Commission explained that it focused only on 
sentencing (using the presumptive sentence approach) only because of 
limitations in its data, which did not cover the earlier stages in the process.14 Its 
approach thus by necessity defined “uniformity” in a very specific, limited way: 
“similar treatment of offenders who appear to be similar[] based on the 
charges of conviction and the facts established at the sentencing hearing.”15 The 
Commission forthrightly acknowledged that “uniformity” in this narrow sense 
was not all that one might aspire to: “Achievement of the more ambitious goal 
of similar treatment of offenders who engage in similar real offense conduct 
will also depend on uniform treatment at presentencing stages.”16 
Because we now have the data the Commission lacked, our research has 
been able to fill the need for a broader approach that the Commission so 
effectively pointed out in 2004. Perhaps the Commission’s perspective on what 
disparities matter has changed over time. In fairness, that perspective might 
properly be different from ours, because the Commission is an institution 
tasked with creating the Sentencing Guidelines and encouraging judges to use 
them; there are reasons for it to focus on disparities in judges’ divergence from 
the Guidelines. The question is whether this is the relevant disparity for 
 
10. PAUL J. HOFER ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES 
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS 
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 81-92 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov 
/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Miscellaneous/15_Year_Study/15_year_study 
_full.pdf. 
11. Id. at 81. 
12. Id. at 92; see also id. at 85-92 (detailing the evidence). 
13. Id. at 92. 
14. Id.; see id. at 88 (observing that research on presentencing disparities was hampered by lack 
of arrest and prosecution-stage data). We note that when this report was written in 2004, 
the linking files that we used to build our multi-agency dataset were not yet available. 
15. Id. at 92. 
16. Id. 
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Congress or other decision-makers to consider, given that they do not 
necessarily share the Commission’s institutional focus. We do not claim that 
studies focusing only on judicial sentencing-choice disparities tell us nothing 
useful—this stage is an important part of the process. But as other researchers 
using such approaches have often acknowledged,17 they provide only a piece of 
the picture of criminal justice disparities. Our work complements such studies 
by offering a more complete view, allowing policymakers to assess Booker’s 
effects across the justice process. 
But even if, like the Commission, one is particularly interested in 
disparities in Guidelines compliance, it is problematic to control for the 
existence and direction of a Guidelines departure (or variance). The decision 
whether to sentence outside the Guidelines at all is likely to be just as 
important a source of disparity in Guidelines compliance as the decision of how 
far outside the Guidelines to go. The use of the departure controls is especially 
a problem for a study assessing Booker’s effects. Booker legally authorized 
Guidelines departures that would not otherwise have been permitted, and its 
one unambiguous, large effect on sentencing practice was that it caused a 
dramatic, immediate increase in departure rates.18 A study cannot assess 
Booker’s effects, even on sentencing relative to the Guidelines, if it filters out 
the aspect of the sentencing decision that Booker changed most dramatically.19 
The reply states that our study “ignore[s] the process judges actually 
use,”20 that it is not “based on the reality of the sentencing process,”21 that we 
“disregard the presumptive sentence,”22 and that we “omit consideration of the 
 
17. E.g., David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the 
U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 288-89 (2001); Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex 
Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level Judge Demographics, 34 J. LEG. STUD. 
57, 70-71 (2005); Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan 
Decision: An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
1077, 1108 (2011); Supriya Sarnikar et al., Do You Receive a Lighter Sentence Because You Are a 
Woman? An Economic Analysis of Federal Criminal Sentencing Guidelines 32 (Inst. for the 
Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 2870, 2007). 
18. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 54 fig.1. 
19. The reply observes that “racial differences between Black males and White males increase 
significantly” if one does not control for departure status. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 259. 
But this observation merely illustrates the importance of departure status as a potential 
disparity source, which is exactly why it should not be used as a control when assessing 
Booker’s effects. The key question for this exercise is not how large the disparity is, but 
whether and how much it changed after Booker and Gall/Kimbrough. The Commission does 
not mention how taking this control away would affect its estimates of the change in 
disparity. 
20. Id. at 256. 
21. Id. at 272. 
22. Id. at 257. 
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sentencing guidelines.”23 With respect, the opposite is true. We fully agree that 
the determination of the Guidelines range, as required by law, is a crucial part 
of the sentencing process. This is precisely why we believe that estimates of 
sentence disparity should include racial disparities that arise in the processes 
that determine the Guidelines range (which include both plea-bargaining and 
judicial fact-finding). In contrast, including the presumptive sentence in the 
regression, as the Commission favors, means that disparities in the sentence 
that result from those processes are excluded from the racial disparity estimate. 
Likewise, controlling for the mandatory minimum and departure status 
excludes the portion of sentencing disparity that comes from the processes that 
determine the mandatory minimum and from the judge’s decision whether to 
depart. 
The reply contests this point, stating: “Rather than ‘filtering out’ a key part 
of the sentencing decision, as Starr and Rehavi assert, our model controls for 
the different steps in the process.”24 This comment risks confusing readers as 
to what a control variable does. Control variables filter things out: specifically, 
they remove from the estimate of racial disparity in the sentence the 
component of that disparity that is explainable by the controls.25 It is not 
always better to control for more factors—especially not factors that are 
actually part of the phenomenon you are interested in measuring.26 
In contrast to the Commission’s narrow approach, our estimates of total 
black-white sentence disparity incorporate the sentencing consequences of all 
of the post-arrest steps in the process. However, not all of our analyses 
aggregate these steps. Table 2 of our article also shows separate analyses of 
Booker’s effects on the individual steps in the process, showing, for instance, its 
effects on disparities in the final Guidelines offense level, in departure rates, 
and in mandatory minimum charging and conviction rates. Our results also 
 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 258. 
25. For a general overview of the function of control variables in regression, see, for example, 
JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 78-79 
(4th ed. 2009) (explaining that the coefficient on the variable x1 in a regression that also 
includes control variables x2 through xk “measures the effect of x1 on y after x2 [through] xk 
have been partialled or netted out”); see also JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, 
MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 35 (2009) (explaining 
that “each coefficient in a multivariate regression is the bivariate slope coefficient for the 
corresponding regressor after partialing out all the other covariates”). 
26. For a useful introduction to the problem of “bad controls,” see ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra 
note 25, at 64-67 (“Some variables are bad controls and should not be included in a 
regression model even when their inclusion might be expected to change the short 
regression coefficients. Bad controls are variables that are themselves outcome variables in 
the notional experiment at hand.”). 
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excluded government-initiated departures (but, as we pointed out, would have 
been the same had we included them), addressing another of the 
Commission’s concerns.27 
Contrary to the reply’s assertions, we do not suggest that judges do not 
“matter at sentencing.”28 We do not embrace any “notion that judging in the 
federal system is limited largely to picking a sentence from a table after adding 
up a numerical score.”29 Nor do we doubt that “judges are very concerned with 
determining the fair sentence and assess all of the evidence presented to them 
with a discerning eye”—although the parties do shape what evidence is 
presented to the judge.30 Moreover, although the importance of prosecutorial 
decision-making was one motivation for our research, we do not assume that 
“prosecutors alone principally determine the sentences imposed.”31 Indeed, 
unlike the Commission, we assume nothing about which of the post-arrest 
justice stages are the most important—that is why we study Booker’s effects on 
all of them. And far from ignoring judges, our approach more effectively 
captures judges’ sentencing-stage contributions to disparity because our 
estimates incorporate differences in departure rates and sentencing fact-
finding. The Commission’s approach, in contrast, filters out those differences, 
narrowly focusing on a small slice even of what judges do. 
Finally, the reply sets forth some limitations of our key control variable, the 
arrest offense.32 We do not claim that the arrest offense is a perfect proxy for 
conduct, nor that the presumptive sentence never captures nuances in conduct 
that the arrest offense misses.33 We pointed out these same limitations in our 
 
27. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 67. 
28. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 251. 
29. Id. at 255. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. Note that we also do not “disregard the influence of the defense community.” Id. To the 
contrary, any disparities potentially produced by counsel treating black and white 
defendants differently at any stage of the process would be included in our estimates of 
disparities arising at those stages. The Commission’s approach, in contrast, effectively filters 
out most defense influence as well as most prosecutorial influence on disparities. 
32. Id. at 262-63. 
33. The reply asserts that the presumptive sentence “provides a nuanced estimate” of the 
defendant’s conduct, “determined by the sentencing judge after considering the evidence 
presented by both parties.” Id. at 258. While this is no doubt often true, the presumptive 
sentence is not a neutral snapshot of conduct that is immune from the possible effects of 
procedural disparities. Even a “nuanced estimate” involves the judge’s discretionary, 
subjective evaluations of the evidence, and there is no reason to assume this process is less 
subject to disparities than departure decisions are. Moreover, fact-finding is only a partially 
judge-driven process. The parties can influence the Guidelines sentence through factual 
stipulations as well as agreements that shape the evidence introduced at sentencing, and a 
survey of federal judges found that they overwhelmingly say that in cases in which the 
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article, and explained why we nonetheless believe the arrest data provide, on 
balance, better information for our purposes about underlying conduct than 
the presumptive sentence does.34 The article also explains that the hundreds of 
arrest offense codes provide far richer data on crime type than the 
Commission’s seven broad categories do.35 We will not repeat these analyses 
here. 
But one point worth emphasizing is that none of the arrest data’s 
limitations particularly matter for the purpose of our analysis of Booker’s 
effects. A major advantage of RD is that, unlike basic regression, it does not 
depend on the assumption that one has successfully observed and controlled 
for all of the differences that could confound the underlying disparity 
estimates. This is because the objective of the analysis is to estimate the change 
in disparity at Booker—not the underlying level of disparity—and that change 
can be validly estimated even if there are omitted variables. The assumption 
underlying our RD analysis is simply that cases immediately on either side of 
the discontinuity were comparable with respect to any omitted differences.36 
Put another way, even if the model omits differences between black and white 
cases, the discontinuity estimate will not be biased so long as the relative 
 
parties have stipulated to the relevant facts, they usually or always defer to those 
stipulations. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 SURVEY 10 
(1997), https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/gssurvey.pdf. And the presumptive 
sentence is also constrained by mandatory minimums, the application of which turns 
heavily on prosecutorial discretion. 
34. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 58-71. 
35. Id. at 24. The reply responds to this point with the non sequitur that our tables do not report 
the statistic R-squared, a linear fit measure for the overall model that has nothing to do with 
whether a model accurately estimates the true effect of any particular factor like crime type. 
Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 260. The fact that variables in the model are collectively good 
predictors of the sentence (which is what R-squared speaks to) does not mean that they 
accurately or precisely capture underlying conduct. See JAMES H. STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, 
INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 234 (3d ed. 2011) (explaining that R-squared is not an 
indicator of whether the choice of the regressors is correct). The objective of this model is 
not to predict every sentence precisely; it is to test for a change in the role of race in 
determining sentences at Booker. A model that includes the presumptive sentence as well as 
departure status and the mandatory minimum will obviously do an excellent job of 
predicting the sentence. Hence the Commission’s model has a very high R-squared. But it 
achieves this predictive power at the expense of controlling for too much, filtering out from 
the racial disparity estimate many of its key procedural sources. Note that the adjusted R-
squared values for our prison sentence regressions vary slightly across the models shown, 
ranging from approximately 0.33 to 0.36. 
36. Because schedules are set in advance while the exact timing of the Court’s decision was not 
known in advance, the placement of cases just before versus just after the discontinuity was 
effectively random. The article discusses this assumption in much more detail, including 
analyzing whether there is any evidence of timing manipulation. 
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underlying, unobserved severity of black and white cases did not suddenly 
change at Booker. Take, for instance, the possibility that loss amounts in fraud 
cases vary by race, a difference our arrest codes cannot capture.37 So long as the 
relative loss amounts involved in black versus white defendants’ cases do not 
suddenly change, breaking from ongoing trends, in the vicinity of Booker, the 
estimates for Booker’s effects on racial disparity in sentencing and other 
outcomes would be unaffected. 
Control variables serve a different function in regression discontinuity 
design than they do in basic regression analyses like the Commission’s—in RD 
they mainly absorb noise. If the control variables do not suddenly change in 
the vicinity of the discontinuity, the RD estimates should be approximately the 
same whether or not they are included.38 And indeed, we ran all our RD 
analyses with and without controls and got similar estimates. This is because 
there is no reason to believe that the underlying pools of cases resulting in 
federal arrests, or the Marshals Service’s coding of those cases, changed 
suddenly right around Booker, much less in racially disparate ways. In contrast, 
it would be problematic to include in the RD analysis control variables that 
could be affected in the short term by Booker itself, and thus it is important that 
we do not control for the presumptive sentence, departure status, or 
mandatory minimum. Instead, we conduct separate RD analyses of each of 
these as outcome variables, to investigate whether they were affected by Booker. 
i i i .  the reply’s comments on our booker analysis  
The objective of our article was to evaluate the causal effects of Booker on 
racial disparity. The reply suggests that the Commission had a different 
objective, seemingly backing away from a causal interpretation of the 
Commission’s findings. Indeed, it suggests that causal identification is not 
important: 
We do not think it important to say (or to disprove) that Booker, or 
Kimbrough and Gall, alone caused the differences we find. Rather, we 
think it is more important to note that demographic differences in 
sentences existed to a much larger extent after those decisions than 
 
37. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 262; Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 33. Note that assessment 
of the Sentencing Commission’s fact-finding data for our sample does not indicate any 
significant racial disparities in loss amount findings—nor, for that matter, in conspiracy-role 
findings. 
38. Guido W. Imbens & Thomas Lemieux, Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice, 
142 J. ECONOMETRICS 615, 626-27 (2008). 
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immediately before them and that policymakers, judges, and the 
Commission should consider this fact.39  
We respectfully disagree. Causal identification is important in order for 
policymakers, judges, and the Commission to know what to make of 
disparities, and to inform their decisions about what solutions, if any, to 
pursue. Even if disparities did exist to a much larger extent after Booker and its 
progeny, if the court decisions did not cause the growth in disparity, then 
disparity would not be a reason to adopt policy measures paring back Booker’s 
effects on judicial discretion. The Commission itself titled its 2012 Report 
“Report on the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal 
Sentencing,” implying a causal connection, and that report contains policy 
recommendations that are premised on the notion that there is a Booker 
problem that needs to be fixed. Our RD analyses showed that, at least where 
racial disparity is concerned, there is no evidence that Booker created a problem. 
As Section III.A of our article detailed, the Commission’s approach does 
not yield valid causal inferences about Booker’s effects. Its method is to 
compare the estimates from separate regressions conducted on sets of cases 
from several separate time periods—most notably, the periods from the 
PROTECT Act to Booker, from Booker to Gall/Kimbrough, and the post-
Gall/Kimbrough period. Because the “black” coefficient is smallest in the first 
(5.5%) of these three periods and largest in the last (19.5%), the Commission 
implies that disparity increased in response to Booker and its progeny.40 
However, one cannot safely attribute differences in the average disparities 
measured in these broad time periods to a single intervening legal event. Many 
things can change over time, any of which could explain these results. 
Differences between the periods before and after an event do not necessarily 
result from the event. It is colder in North America during the two months 
after December 25 than during the preceding two months, but one cannot 
therefore infer that the exchange of Christmas gifts by many families caused 
winter. Similarly, racial disparity as the Commission measures it could have 
been higher in the later time periods for reasons unrelated to Booker. For 
example, even if judicial behavior did not noticeably change, the composition 
of the pools of cases in the three periods might have been different, with the 
 
39. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 271. 
40. Note that beyond the problem of causal inference from change across such broad time 
periods, another problem with the Commission’s approach of comparing estimates across 
separate regressions is that the effects of the control variables are not held constant across 
regressions. 
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later pools involving more cases with characteristics that tend to produce 
greater racial disparity.41 
Moreover, another serious threat to causal inference is the possibility that 
the presumptive sentence and the problematic control variables might have 
changed in response to Booker, or otherwise changed over time, in ways that 
are not explained by changes in underlying criminal conduct. For instance, if 
fact-finding disparities were declining over the period (as Table 1 of our article 
suggests), the presumptive sentence control might effectively mean something 
different in the later time periods than it did in the earlier time periods, relative 
to underlying conduct. This would mean that racial disparity estimates that 
condition on the presumptive sentence could not fairly be compared across 
time periods—the presumptive sentence has become a different “yardstick” for 
measuring the severity of conduct.42 
In response to these criticisms, the reply offers a description of a new 
analysis that its authors conducted, which replicates the Commission’s separate 
regressions but reduces the time periods being compared to three six-month 
periods: just before Blakely v. Washington, between Blakely and Booker, and 
after Booker. The reply states that disparity increased from each period to the 
next, although the size of the increase is not stated. This reduction of the time 
periods’ length is a welcome modification, but this new analysis does not 
resolve the causal inference concerns. The shorter periods do not solve the 
problem that the presumptive sentence or other control variables could have 
been affected by Booker (or Blakely), creating a “changing yardstick” problem. 
Moreover, the eighteen-month period on which this new analysis focuses, 
while less problematic than the original, longer periods, is still long enough 
that background trends or other events could confound the results. Our 
regression discontinuity approach, in contrast, controls for those background 
trends so that it can separately identify sharp breaks in the trends.43 
In addition, the findings of the reply’s new analysis do not actually seem to 
support the conclusion that Booker increased disparity. The reply finds that the 
increase in disparity (as the Commission measures it) began before Booker, in 
the period surrounding Blakely.44 The reply contends that these new findings 
show that “the impact of Booker . . . may have begun even before the date of 
 
41. As we discuss further in Part III below, one candidate for such a change is the major 
expansion in the immigration docket. 
42. For a fuller treatment of this “changing yardstick” problem, see Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, 
at 40-48. 
43. The new analysis also still amounts to comparisons across separate time periods, without 
holding the control variables constant across the time periods as one would if the periods 
were combined in a single “differences-in-differences” analysis. 
44. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 270. 
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that decision,” namely, with “the decision in Blakely, a case with a holding very 
similar to Booker but which applied only to state court cases.”45 The implication 
of this argument is that the post-Booker sentencing-procedure regime, on 
which the Commission blames the increase in disparity, actually began not 
with Booker but with Blakely. But this interpretation is implausible. While 
Blakely’s Sixth Amendment holding was indeed similar to Booker’s, its remedy 
was not; it did not loosen constraints on judicial discretion. No circuit adopted 
a Booker-like remedy during the period between Blakely and Booker, and the 
Guidelines remained mandatory in every federal court. Nor did district courts 
begin acting as though their discretion had expanded. As shown in Figure 1 of 
our article, there was no rise in departure rates after Blakely—until Booker, 
when they immediately spiked. 
Blakely might well have changed the incentives and actions of the parties, 
and in some courts it likely changed fact-finding, because certain circuits began 
to require aggravating facts to be proven to juries. These possibilities are the 
reason we confined our Booker analysis to the “business as usual” circuits and 
carried out other assessments of Blakely’s effects. But the Commission’s 
measure of disparity does not focus on the parties, nor on fact-finding; it 
focuses only on judicial sentencing relative to the Guidelines. The increased 
disparity it finds before Booker cannot be attributed to judges’ expanded 
discretion, because that discretion did not expand until Booker was decided.46 
Instead, the Commission’s new analysis is consistent with the theory that the 
increased disparity it found after Booker was the result of an unrelated 
background trend. 
In contrast to the Commission’s methods, our regression discontinuity-
style approach is a rigorous method for estimating causal effects, and provides 
no evidence that Booker increased disparity. The reply critiques our focus on 
Booker’s short-term effects, attributing to us the straw-man position “that the 
full impact of Booker would be seen in the weeks or months immediately after 
Booker.”47 Our article makes clear that we do not believe this is true, but also 
explains that it does not need to be true for regression discontinuity analysis to 
 
45. Id. at 270-71. 
46. If Blakely (and not some unrelated background trend) is indeed responsible for increased 
disparity as the Commission measures it, it is most likely because it changed the parties’ 
behavior or changed fact-finding, and thereby changed the relationship of the Commission’s 
control variables to underlying criminal conduct. The apparent increase in sentence 
disparity relative to the presumptive sentence might, as we showed with the long-term 
trends in Table 1 of our article, really be a result of reduced disparity in the presumptive 
sentence, not increased disparity in sentencing. 
47. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 269. 
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nonetheless tell us something important about Booker’s causal effects.48 It is not 
that we should expect Booker’s full effects to have been seen right away—it is 
that, if one is to infer that Booker dramatically increased racial disparity, one 
should expect to see some of that effect immediately after Booker. After all, 
Booker did have a dramatic, immediate, discontinuous effect on judges’ 
willingness to depart from the Guidelines.49 If judges used their newfound 
departure authority in ways that disproportionately benefited white defendants 
or harmed black defendants, one would expect at least some of that disparate 
effect to appear fairly quickly, given that they started using that authority right 
away. But it did not. Nor, for that matter, were there any sudden increases in 
disparity after Kimbrough and Gall.50 Moreover, our estimation of the long-
term trend also failed to find an increase in disparity. 
Of course, as we observe in our article, it would be wonderful if Booker’s 
long-term causal effects could also be analyzed in a rigorous way. 
Unfortunately, this is not possible. The methods the Sentencing Commission 
uses cannot do it, and we are pleased that the reply essentially acknowledges 
this point.51 Too many things change over time. The best that can be done is to 
assess the short-term causal effects using RD—and the RD analyses do not 
find an increase in disparity. Moreover, again, our analysis of the long-term 
trends (which we do not claim are causally linked to Booker) also fails to find an 
increase in disparity, and, if anything, suggests a decline. 
iv.  our sample  
The reply repeatedly criticizes our study’s sample, contending that it 
represents only a narrow subset of federal cases during the relevant period. 
First, it is false that our sample excludes drug cases,52 or that it otherwise 
consists of a narrow subset of crimes.53 As our article clearly states, the sample 
 
48. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 8-9, 49-52. 
49. Id. at 54 fig.1. 
50. As described in our article, we did not focus our main analysis on these cases because, unlike 
Booker, they did not involve sharp changes in judicial departure behavior nor did they 
constitute dramatic changes in the law, so one would not really have expected sudden 
changes in disparity either. 
51. See Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 271. 
52. Id. at 266-67. 
53. We are not sure where the reply’s specific claim that our sample includes only “twenty 
percent” of cases during the study period comes from. Id. at 254, 264. The sample does 
exclude immigration and identity theft, but otherwise includes all black and white offenders. 
The Booker RD analysis excludes certain circuits because of the Blakely complication, as 
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for the RD analysis “includes all non-immigration cases except identity theft, 
which was subject to other major sentencing-law changes very near Booker.”54 
Notwithstanding the article’s repeated clarifications of this point,55 the authors 
appear to be confusing our article’s study of Booker with the separate study of 
charging disparities that we summarized in Part II; that study had excluded 
drug cases from some, but not all, of the analyses, and the alternative analyses 
that did include them found similar disparity patterns.56 Likewise, the Booker 
 
explained above and in the article, but results were substantively similar when they were 
included. 
54. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 53; see also id. at 59 (noting that the RD method allowed 
analysis of charging changes in “all case types”). 
55. See id. at 7 n.13 (“The charging study’s analysis of drug cases is somewhat more limited. In 
contrast, this Article’s study of Booker includes drug cases in all its analyses.” (citation 
omitted)); id. at 30 n.93 (“In its recent report, the Sentencing Commission criticizes [the 
charging study] for excluding drug trafficking cases but makes no mention of the additional 
analyses showing that the results are similar in those cases. Note, in any event, that the 
Booker analysis, infra Part III, which is a more direct counterpoint to the Commission’s 
Booker report, uses a broader sample that includes these cases.” (citation omitted)); see also 
id. at 5-6 n.9 (citing the working paper version of the charging study and explaining more 
generally the differences between the two studies). 
56. See Rehavi & Starr, supra note 6, at 7-8 (discussing the reasons for the exclusion and the 
alternative analyses). The reply offers some confused critiques of these additional analyses 
from the charging study. Contrary to the reply’s suggestion, the charging study’s analysis of 
drug and child pornography cases never uses the “additional charge variable . . . that [we] 
had earlier explained . . . involved ‘ambiguities.’” Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 267. Instead, 
we assessed the extent to which otherwise-unexplained sentencing disparities could be 
explained by the final mandatory minimum recorded at sentencing, which is recorded for all 
cases. The reply then suggests that our willingness “to use sentencing data” reveals an 
inconsistency, because we critique the Commission and other researchers for doing so. Id. 
But we have never claimed that sentencing data is unreliable or should never be used for any 
purpose. The decomposition uses that data to identify the share of the total unexplained gap 
that appears to be attributable to the mandatory minimum, which is appropriate; unlike the 
Commission, however, we do not control for the mandatory minimum when we estimate 
the size of that total unexplained gap in the first place.  
The reply also alleges that we do not explain the specifics of this analysis, such as 
whether we could control for drug type and quantity. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 265 n.55. 
The brief summary of our other study included in our article indeed did not go into detail, 
but as we explain in Rehavi & Starr, supra note 6, at 21 n.40, drug type seized at arrest is 
included in all analyses of drug cases. Drug quantity seized at arrest is only reliably available 
before 2004 and is not included in the primary analysis, but we repeated our analyses during 
the years 2001-2003 adding quantity controls, and found the results robust to this addition. 
Meanwhile, our Yale Law Journal article’s analysis of Booker’s effects does not include drug 
quantity controls, but the RD-style approach makes this omission extremely unlikely to bias 
the results. The omission would only affect the Booker results if the distribution of drug 
quantities seized at arrest happened to change suddenly and in racially disparate ways in the 
immediate vicinity of Booker. This would seem an unlikely coincidence, and qualitative 
research on drug enforcement during this period finds no evidence that suggests such a 
sudden change. Furthermore, because the length of elapsed time between arrest and 
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study is obviously not limited to “data only from fiscal years 2007 to 2009.”57 
Nor does the Booker study exclude non-U.S. citizens, contrary to the reply’s 
claim.58 
It is true that we include Hispanic offenders in the black and white groups 
in some of our analyses.59 Hispanic persons can identify with various racial 
groups, and there is no reason that disparities between black and white 
Hispanics should not count as black-white racial disparity. In any event, 
however, the results of our RD analysis, as we explained in the article, were 
unchanged if we instead exclude Hispanic defendants, focusing on the gap 
between non-Hispanic white and black defendants.60 Our analysis of the long-
term trends from 2003 through 2009 (Table 1 of our article) was designed to 
track the Sentencing Commission’s sample as closely as possible, except for the 
exclusion of immigration cases. It therefore excluded Hispanic defendants and 
focused only on black and white non-Hispanic men.61 When Hispanic 
defendants are included instead, estimates of the decline in disparity over that 
period are somewhat larger and statistically significant, as our article 
explains.62 
The one truly substantial difference between our sample and the 
Commission’s concerns immigration cases. Immigration cases are a big part of 
the federal docket (although they are, in fact, quite a small part of the black-
white incarceration disparity picture).63 But there are good reasons that we, 
like many other researchers, excluded them. First, changes in immigration 
cases could very well be an example of a strong background trend during the 
study period that confounds the Commission’s results. While the volume of 
non-immigration cases was fairly stable, the number of immigration arrests 
 
conviction or sentencing varies, even if arrest patterns had changed in some sudden way 
before Booker, there should be no discontinuous effect on convictions or sentences entered 
immediately after Booker. 
57. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 265. 
58. Compare id. at 268, with Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 53 (explaining that non-citizens are 
included and that results would have been similar had they been excluded). The charging 
study, in contrast, did exclude non-citizens from the main analysis, but it explains that its 
results are unchanged when they are included. Rehavi & Starr, supra note 6, at 13, 21. 
59. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 268-69. 
60. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 53 n.166 
61. Id. at 46-47. 
62. Id. at 46 n.149. 
63. According to the Sentencing Commission’s data from the year of Booker, less than two 
percent of immigration defendants were black, and less than three percent of black 
defendants were sentenced on immigration charges. Meanwhile, immigration sentences are 
typically short, so immigration cases constitute an even smaller share of the black federal 
prison population. 
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recorded in the Marshals Service database more than tripled from 2003 to 
2009, from approximately 25,000 to approximately 85,000. The number of 
sentenced immigration defendants in the Sentencing Commission’s dataset 
also increased substantially, but not quite as dramatically, from approximately 
14,000 to approximately 24,000. Thus, at least two changes seem to have been 
underway during that period. First, there was an explosion in the immigration 
caseload. Second, there were also very likely changes in the way many of the 
cases were being processed, such that many more cases did not proceed to 
sentencing on a non-petty offense at all, or at least were greatly delayed such 
that they did not do so within the studied time period. If one is attempting to 
assess Booker’s effects by looking at changes across a time period, it is risky to 
include a huge category of cases that was so transformed during that period. 
Indeed, if disparities are higher when immigration cases are included than 
when they are not (as an alternative analysis by Jeffrey Ulmer, Michael Light, 
and John Kramer concluded),64 the growth in immigration’s share of the 
federal caseload during the Commission’s study period could explain why the 
Commission observed higher disparities in the later periods. But that 
explanation is not related to Booker. It is an example of the type of unrelated 
trend that the Commission’s method cannot rule out. 
Second, immigration cases differ from other cases both procedurally (they 
are often subject to fast-track processing) and substantively: for almost all 
offenders, their stakes turn in substantial part on deportation. The reply is 
correct that most immigration offenders also serve a short prison sentence.65 
But deportation is inarguably a critical part of the outcome for most offenders, 
and to compare the severity of outcomes in immigration cases on the basis of 
incarceration alone is potentially misleading. 
The Commission also observes that our sample lost some cases due to 
inability to link them across agencies.66 This is true, but link rates at every 
stage were quite high,67 and we conducted analyses that found no racial 
disparities in link rates, suggesting little reason to believe that the algorithm’s 
 
64. Ulmer et al., supra note 17, at 1098. 
65. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 268. 
66. Id. at 261-62. 
67. The reply states that we “were able to match only sixty-eight percent of the cases.” Id. at 261. 
We are not certain where this figure came from; it does not appear in our work. But we note 
that many of the non-linking cases that the Commission may be referring to were not 
algorithm failures, but were cases in which the case’s disposition meant that it was simply 
not handled by the next agency in the chain—for instance, cases never referred to the U.S. 
Attorney’s office, cases declined by prosecutors, cases handled as petty offenses by 
magistrates, and cases that were dismissed. Such cases would not be included in the 
Sentencing Commission’s dataset either. The link rates are further discussed in Rehavi & 
Starr, supra note 6, Data App. 
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imperfections biased the results. We also conducted analyses of Booker’s effects 
on racial disparities in the rate at which non-petty charges are brought and the 
rate at which such cases result in conviction, finding none. These analyses were 
important in order to assess the possibility of sample selection bias, because 
conviction on a non-petty charge is necessary for a case to make it into the 
Sentencing Commission’s data. The Commission’s analysis is equally 
susceptible to these sources of sample selection bias, and yet the Commission 
did not (and could not, in the absence of other agencies’ data) carry out any 
analyses of whether the subset of cases that made it into their dataset varied 
across the different time periods. Indeed, the immigration figures cited above 
strongly suggest that it did.68 
conclusion  
We stand by our conclusion that there is no evidence that Booker and its 
progeny increased disparity in the sentences of comparable black and white 
offenders. The Commission’s empirical staff indicate in their reply that causal 
inference was not the goal of their study; it was, however, the goal of ours. And 
our regression discontinuity analysis shows no evidence that Booker caused 
substantial changes in the sentences received by black and white arrestees with 
comparable arrest offenses and characteristics, nor does it show any clear 
evidence that Booker caused an increase in disparity in any specific stage of the 
judicial process. Moreover, longer-term analysis shows that in the years 
surrounding Booker, there was no increase (there was possibly a slight decline) 
in sentence disparity for comparable black and white arrestees. The 
Commission’s contrary findings appear to be driven not by changes in 
sentencing, but by a trend of declining disparity in its key control variable, the 
presumptive sentence, along with other potential confounders. This point 
illustrates the wisdom of the warning the Commission itself issued back in 
2004: analyzing sentencing disparity in isolation from other parts of the justice 
process risks missing an important part of the picture. 
We do not wish to minimize the concern of racial disparity in the justice 
process. Indeed, our work has emphasized the importance of this concern, 
exploring prosecutorial charging discretion as an important mechanism behind 
racial disparity. But the problem, while persistent, does not appear to be 
growing, nor does it appear to be the result of expanding judicial discretion. 
 
68. The reply observes that we “have not made [our] data available for further analysis.” 
Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 261 n.43. As the authors are surely aware, we are prohibited 
from directly sharing restricted federal data, but the Sentencing Commission has ready 
access to all the data we have (including the multi-agency linking files), which come from 
the Commission itself and other federal agencies and are also available to other researchers. 
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And if expansions of judicial discretion did not cause an increase in disparity, 
re-imposing constraints on that discretion may not be a solution. 
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